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Abstract— In the last few years authentication has become
of paramount importance both on the corporate Intranets and
on the global Web. While most approaches focus on the initial
authentication and then no further check ensure the identity of
the navigating user, in this work we present a fuzzy approach
to multi-modal authentication for a trust-based, continuous
identity check during Web navigation. The potentiality of
such an approach for generating trust-based metadata is also
discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last few years, the web has entered the day-by-
day life of million of people giving the opportunity to
exchange lots of information by means of the interchange
of documents. Recently the web community has asked for
the possibility to integrate and combine data drawn from
different sources, i.e., asking to navigate the web as an
immense, integrated, data collection. Answer to this need
is the Semantic Web [1], which includes a common format
for integration and combination of data drawn from different
sources, and a language for recording how the data relates
to real world objects. Obviously, in such a powerful en-
vironment security plays an important role since it allows
to insert data reserved to trusted users into this “integrated
source”. Hence, ensuring an adequate level of protection to
data is an essential part of any comprehensive web security
program, and often this means to provide a strong and
effective access control system. While most researchers have
focused on protecting data and documents (often expressed in
XML) [3], we believe that the effectiveness of access control
systems rests on one initial important assumption, proper
user identification [4]: no one should be able to acquire
the access rights of another person. In the literature [9] this
condition has been faced with two different approaches: bio-
metric identification and biometric authentication. Biometric
identification and authentication are differentiated as follow:
biometric identification occurs when an individual provides a
sample biometric, sometimes without any additional knowl-
edge, and the system must compare that sample with every
stored record to identify a match. This is known as a one-
to-many match, and is executed without any corroborating
data. By contrast, biometric authentication occurs when an
individual presents a biometric sample, and some additional
identifying data, such as a photograph or password, which
is then compared with the stored sample for that individual.
Biometric authentication provides some inherent advantages
as compared to other non-biometric identifiers since biomet-
rics correspond to a direct evidence of the personal identity
versus possession of secrets which can be potentially stolen.
Moreover, most of the times the biometric enrollment is
executed in-person and in controlled environments making
it very reliable for future use. Both engines try to check
the user’s credentials before granting access to a computer
system.
Some issues related to strong (i.e., biometric) authentica-
tion methods are still unsolved. In some cases, if the input
sample quality is not sufficient for further processing, the
system must reacquire data, and the resulting system might
be more complicated or more expensive. Furthermore some
biometric sensors, particularly those having contact with
users, have a limited lifetime. In highly sensitive environ-
ments, such as health-care databases, it may be necessary to
perform strong authentication many times (e.g., at random
intervals) to prevent identity substitution after the initial
authentication step. In such a scenario, the authentication
system must distinguish between the initial step, in which
it uses strong authentication to identify the user, and the
following authentication steps in which the system decides if
its trust in user’s identity is high enough to allow the user to
continue to perform the activity she is doing. Multi-modal
biometric systems integrate multiple authentication tech-
niques. Multi-modality will be important for many security
applications, including checking the digital passports of the
future, incorporating biometric data besides the portrait im-
age. In this paper, we propose a multi-modal authentication
system that combines strong authentication with conventional
password-based techniques providing high accuracy. In our
approach, different trust levels are set for different methods
of authentication. When a user gains access to a protected
part of the web, our system continuously checks whether
the users’ authentication data can be trusted, e.g. enough
to satisfy the required security clearance level. In this way,
users are kept under a continuous authentication process and
security clearance levels can be rigorously maintained. In
particular, focus of this paper is a deep discussion of the
methodologies for biometric authentication available w.r.t.
their possible use in conjunction with a fuzzy controller.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. II contains a brief
overview of advantages and drawbacks of authentication
techniques, Sect. III discusses the basic problem posed by a
fuzzy representation of biometric authentication techniques,
in Sect. IV we present our fuzzy controller for multi-modal
authentication, and finally, in Sect. V we draw our conclusion
and present some future work.
A. Related Work
Several security methods for user authentication to control
access to an information service have been discussed in the
literature, showing how the identity theft becomes a critical
issue, together with the management of rights. Indeed, as
previously defined, traditional authentication systems may
become inadequate since they do not identify a user as such.
As indicated in the work carried out by Bhargav-Spantzel
and colleagues [9], the act of impersonating others identi-
ties by presenting stolen identifiers or proofs of identities
has been receiving increasing attention because of its high
financial and social costs. For this reason, the adoption
of biometric authentication systems becomes an emerging
approach to the problem of reducing such identity theft.
The authors provided a two-phase authentication mechanism
for federated indentity management systems, preserving the
privacy with biometrics techniques.
Further improvements have been carried out in the last few
years, increasing the awareness that multi-modal authentica-
tion (i.e., techniques more than one form of credential to
identify a user) is generally stronger than any single-mode
authentication method. In multi-modal systems “redundancy”
is used to tolerate possible failures of authentication devices,
including those due to users anomalies (e.g., eye diseases
which may prevent iris recognition systems from capturing
an appropriate image of the user’s eye, or skin diseases
which may prevent fingerprint acquisition). In this context,
the multi-modal approach was originally introduced in order
to alleviate the drawbacks of each individual technique. The
work [14] presents a multi-biometric verification system that
combines speaker verification, fingerprint verification with
face identification. The authors use a fuzzy decision support
system in order to take into account the external conditions
that can affect verification performances. They show how
the fusion of the three techniques reduces the error rates of
48% w.r.t. the speaker verification alone. Another interesting
work is [15] that improves security by using typing biometric
to reinforce password authentication mechanism. Also this
methodology employs fuzzy logic to measure the user’s typ-
ing biometrics. About face recognition, [17] presents a face
template matching algorithm based on a 3D head model cre-
ated from a single frontal face image. In this way the match-
ing is robust across variations in pose, expression and illu-
minations conditions. This work was extended in [18] where
authors describe a method for tracking a face on a video
sequence, by recovering the full-motion and the expression
deformation of the face using 3D expressive facial model.
From some characteristic face points given on the first frame,
an approximated 3D model of the face is re-constructed.
Using a steepest descent image approach, the algorithm is
able to extract simultaneously the parameters related to the
face expression and to the 3D posture. Industrial researchers
at Hitachi (http://www.sdl.hitachi.co.jp) devel-
oped a fully-fledged multi-modal system capable of choos-
ing the “right” authentication technique depending on the
required security clearance level. However, to the best of
our knowledge [16] is the first paper where multi-modality is
applied to the problem of checking continuously user identity
during a working session to avoid malicious behavior such
as identity substitution.
II. ADVANTAGES AND DRAWBACKS OF
AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES
User authentication is essential for reliable access control
and rights management systems to determine a user autho-
rization to access the content [4]. Different authentication
techniques may be appropriate for different applications,
depending on perceived user profiles, the need to interface
with other systems or database, environmental conditions,
and other application specific parameters. Several works
have been carried out in the literature by considering these
features. In the work of O’Gorman [7] a detailed comparison
of strong (biometric) and weak (traditional) authentication
technologies has been carried out, discussing about the
potential attacks against each technique and the main issues
related to several applications. Sect. II-A II-B briefly point
out their main advantages and drawbacks.
A. Traditional Authentication Techniques
As previously defined, the main advantage of traditional
techniques is that they are easy to implement in a authen-
tication system, but they cannot identify the user as such.
In the Knowledge-based case, a password can be guessed
or searched by an attacker and a long, random, changing
password is difficult to remember. In the other case, with
Token-based, a physical device can be lost, stolen, forgotten
or disclosed. Moreover, considering the trustworthyness in
distributed systems, other several aspects regarding these
techniques have to be considered, as follows.
• Knowledge-based techniques, thanks to challenge-
response password protocols, have proved robust against
replay and transmission attacks. However, these tech-
niques do not support compromise detection and do not
offer much defense against repudiation.
• Token-based techniques provide for compromise detec-
tion and add protection against denial-of-service attacks.
The two main shortcomings of token-based techniques
are high cost, and vulnerability to theft. Token validation
requires equipment whose cost is comparable to the one
of (much more secure) biometric systems.
B. Biometric Authentication Techniques
These methods are inherently more reliable than password-
based authentication, as they are less easily lent or stolen than
others; furthermore they are extremely difficult to copy, share
and distribute. For this reason, biometric systems provide a
much stronger defense against repudiation.
The main issue in biometric authentication systems is
performance, defined considering different factors, depending
on critical issues in the data acquisition phase. Problems also
include limited lifetime of particular biometrics, and possible
violations of the user privacy.
The most commonly biometric technologies implemented
are reported below:
• Fingerprint is based on matching numeric informa-
tion of finger minutie. It is easy, fast of use and the
hardware devices are low cost. It has considered the
higher authentication form from the people, even if
some problems can occur during acquisition phase, in
particular in dusty and humid environments.
• Hand Geometry involves analyzing and measuring the
shape of the hand. It offers a good balance of perfor-
mance characteristics and is relatively easy of use, the
accuracy can be very high, together with a satisfactory
hardware technology. Drawbacks are related to the
sensitivity to high lighting.
• Iris analyzes features found in the iris, uses a fairly con-
ventional camera element and requires no close contact
between the user and the reader. It is genetic aspects
independent and not easily alterable. For these reasons
it has the potential for higher than average template-
matching performance, even though easy of use and
system integration have not traditionally been strong
points with iris scanning devices, being still considered
as an intrusive system.
• Face analyzes facial characteristics. It requires a dig-
ital camera to develop a facial image of the user for
authentication. It is a no-invasive approach and it does
not require contact between the user and the phisical
device. The main problem of this technique regards
its sensitivity to a high lighting and to the evolvable
features of the face.
• Retina involves analyzing the layer of blood vessels sit-
uated at the back of the eye. As established technology,
this technique involves using a low intensity light source
through an optical coupler to scan the unique patterns
of the retina. Retinal scanning can be quite accurate, but
does require the user to look into a receptacle and focus
on a given point. This is not particularly convenient
if a user wears glasses or is concerned about having
close contact with the reading device. For these reasons,
retinal scanning is not warmly accepted by all users,
even though the technology itself can give satisfactory
results.
• Voice Speaker, or voice, recognition, is a biometric
modality that uses an individual’s voice for recogni-
tion purposes. The seemingly easy implementation of
speaker recognition systems contributes to the process’s
measure weakness — susceptibility to transmission
channel and microphone variability and noise. Systems
can face problems when end users have enrolled on a
clean landline phone and attempt verification using a
noisy cellular phone. The inability to control the factors
effecting the input system can significantly decrease
performance.
• Signature analyzes the way a user signs her name.
Signing features such as speed and pressure are as im-
portant as the finished signature’s static shape. Signature
verification enjoys a synergy with existing processes
that other biometrics do not and the physical devices
are reasonably accurate in operation and obviously lend
themselves to applications where a signature is an ac-
cepted identifier. Anyway, signature is still an evolvable
feature, with a low-level stable factor. For this reason
relatively few significant signature applications have
emerged compared with other biometric methodologies.
III. FUZZY REPRESENTATIONS OF BIOMETRIC
AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES
In this section we discuss which authentication device
commercially available can be used with a fuzzy controller.
Commonly biometric devices base their final decision (au-
thenticated/refused) on a matching between a stored template
and a new biometric acquisition, obviously each technique
implements a different matching function and not all outputs
of these functions are suitable to work as input of a fuzzy
controller. Moreover, biometric matching is probabilistic in
nature, which implies that two samples of the same individual
are never exactly the same. In detail:
• Fingerprint is based on matching numeric information
of finger minutie. There are basically two techniques:
minutie-based and correlation-based. The first tech-
nique finds minutie and builds a matrix containing
minutie coordinates; the matching value is computed on
the basis of a distance function between the template
and the new acquisition matrices. Instead, the second
technique maps minutie position w.r.t. a fixed point,
then the matching value is computed on the basis of the
number of corresponding points between the template
and the new acquisition images. If the matching values
exceed a given threshold the authentication succeeds.
• Hand Geometry involves analyzing and measuring the
shape of the hand. This technique registers about 90
different hand features such as length, width, or finger
thickness. These metrics define the feature vector of
the user’s hand. The matching value is computed by
a vectorial distance function. Again, if this distance
exceeds a given threshold the authentication succeeds.
• Iris analyzes features found in the iris using an image
captured in controlled environments. Using a 2D Gabor
wavelet filter [24], the technique maps the segments of
the iris into phasors (vectors). Iris patters are described
by an IrisCode [25] using phase information collected in
the phasors. To perform the recognition, two IrisCodes
are compared. The amount of difference between two
IrisCodes — Hamming Distance (HD) — is used as
a test of statistical independence between the template
and the new acquisition IrisCodes.
• Retina As discussed above, iris recognition utilizes the
iris muscle to perform verification. Retinal recognition
uses the unique pattern of blood vessels on an individ-
uals retina.
• Face analyzes facial characteristics. There are two pre-
dominant approaches to the face recognition problem:
biometric (feature based) and photometric (view based).
Many different algorithms were developed but the main
three ones are: Principal Components Analysis (PCA),
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA), and Elastic Bunch
Graph Matching (EBGM). The PCA approach decom-
poses the face structure into orthogonal components
known as eigenfaces. Each face image may be rep-
resented as a weighted sum (feature vector) of the
eigenfaces, which are stored in 1D array. A probe image
is compared against the template by measuring the dis-
tance between their respective feature vector. LDA is a
statistical approach for classifying samples of unknown
classes based on training samples with known classes.
This technique aims to maximize between-class (i.e.,
across users) variance and minimize within-class (i.e.,
within user) variance. EBGM relies on the concept that
real face images have many non linear characteristics
that are not addressed by the linear analysis methods
discussed earlier, such as variations in illumination,
pose, and expression. A Gabor wavelet transform creates
a dynamic link architecture that projects the face onto
an elastic grid. The Gabor jet is a node on the elastic
grid, notated by circles on the image below, which
describes the image behavior around a given pixel. It
is the result of a convolution of the image with a Gabor
filter, which is used to detect shapes and to extract
features using image processing 1. Precognition is based
on the similarity of the Gabor filter response at each
Gabor node.
The most commercially used technique is the PCA,
which is also the best suitable to join a fuzzy controller,
just defining membership functions for the vector dis-
tance.
• Voice Speaker, or voice recognition, is a biometric
modality that uses an individual’s voice for recognition
purposes 2. The speaker recognition process relies on
features influenced by both the physical structure of an
individual’s vocal tract and the behavioral characteristics
of the individual. A popular choice for remote authen-
tication due to the availability of devices for collecting
speech samples and its ease of integration, speaker
recognition is different from some other biometric meth-
ods in that speech samples are captured dynamically or
over a period of time, such as a few seconds. Analysis
occurs on a model in which changes over time are
monitored, which is similar to other behavioral bio-
metrics such as dynamic signature, gait, and keystroke
recognition. There are two forms of speaker recognition:
1A convolution expresses the amount of overlap from functions, blanding
the functions together.
2It is a different technology than speech recognition, which recognizes
words as they are articulated, which is not a biometric.
text dependent and text independent. In systems using
text dependent speech, the individual presents header
a fixed (password) or prompted (please say 3 4 6 9)
phrase that is programmed into the system and can
improve performance expecially with cooperative users.
Speech samples are waveforms with the time on the
horizontal axes and the loudness on the vertical access.
The speaker recognition system analyzes the frequency
content of the speech and compares characteristics such
as the quality, duration, intensity dynamics, and pitch of
the signal. In text dependent system the voice sample
is converted from an analog format to a digital format,
the feature of the individual’s voice are extracted, and
then a model is created. Most test dependent speaker
verification systems use the context of Hidden Markov
Models (HMMs), random based models that provide
a statistical representation of the sounds produced by
the individual. The HMM represents the underline
variations and temporal changes over time found in
the speech states using the quality-duration-intensity
dynamics-pitch characteristics mentioned above. An-
other method is the Gaussian Mixture Model, a state-
mapping model closely related to HMM, that is often
used for unconstraint text independent application. Like
HMM, this method uses the voice to create a number
of vector states representing the various sound forms,
which are characteristics of physiology and behavior
of the individual. These methods all compare the sim-
ilarities and differences between the input voice and
the stored voice states to produce a recognition deci-
sion. The input voice sample and enrolled models are
compared to produce a likelihood ratio indicating the
likelihood that the input sample came from the claimed
or hypothesized speaker.
• Signature dynamic signature recognition uses multiple
characteristics in the analysis of an individual’s hand-
writing. These characteristics vary in use and impor-
tance from vendor to vendor and are collected using
contact sensitive technologies, such as PDAs, digitizing
tablets. Most of the features used are dynamic charac-
teristics rather than static and geometric characteristics,
although some vendors also include these characteris-
tics in their analysis. Common dynamic characteristics
include velocity, acceleration, timing, pressure, and di-
rection of the signature strokes, all analyzed in the X,
Y and Z direction. Some dynamic signature recognition
algorithms incorporate a learning function to account for
the natural changes or drift that occur in an individual’s
signature over time.
The recognition methods vary widely. The dominant
methods are feature analysis and stroke code sequences
used by most of the commercial systems. Some systems
use chain codes, some others use template matching or
elastic matching. The chain codes are of extreme points:
left, right, top and bottom. Template matching simply
means matching an unknown character against stored
character templates. This template matching system
matches sequences of x/y coordinates, probably in a
linear manner. Elastic matching is a form of nonlinear
template matching [19].
Obviously, not all the techniques presented above are
suitable inputs for a fuzzy controller. For example fin-
gerprint, hand geometry, iris, retina and face recognition
base their matching function on the definition of distance
values between templates and new enrollments, giving a
straightforward definition of possible membership functions
in a fuzzy controller. On the other side, behavioral techniques
such as voice or signature authentication base their matching
mechanism on statistical considerations making more diffi-
cult a possible interpretation in a fuzzy system.
Since our approach needs to continuously check the iden-
tity of the user while she is working, we want it to be
the least intrusive as possible. Hence we will not consider
devices such as retina or iris systems, because they would
require the user to interrupt her activity for a while during
the biometric acquisition process. In this work, we will
not deal with fingerprint and hand geometry because these
techniques require devices having a limited lifetime. More
importantly, they hardly guarantee that the person who is
provides biometric data is the same that was authenticated
originally. For example, suppose that university students sit
their exams using a computer application without faculty
supervision. In such a scenario, identity substitution could
easily be performed after authentication, with the consent
of the authenticated user, even if the authentication system
keeps on requesting fingerprints. The original user could just
stay available to provide fingerprints when required, while
another student works on the examination paper. On the
other hand, in the case of face recognition a digital camera
can be installed on the top of the computer display, pointing
in the direction of the user. The user does not know if the
entire session is recorded or if the camera is used only for an
automatic authentication, therefore malicious behavior is less
likely. Of course, face recognition suffers of other drawbacks
such as inconsistent presentation (i.e. different acquisitions
may represent different poses of a face), irreproducible
presentation (e.g. due to facial hair growth, a broken nose
or wearing eyeglasses) and imperfect signal/representation
acquisition (e.g. due to different illuminations). However
it has been experimentally tested [7] that face recognition
is affected by a experimentally determined FNMR (False
NonMatch Rate) of 16% and a FMR (False Match Rate)
= 16%. In our context these values can be decidedly reduced
just by asking the user to check the illumination conditions of
the room where she is working. However, face recognition is
the choice we made in this setting and with the motivation
stated above, but our approach is general enough to allow
to choose one or more different biometric techniques to
authenticate users in a different situation.
IV. A FUZZY CONTROLLER FOR MULTI-MODAL
AUTHENTICATION
In this paper, we propose a multi-modal authentication
system that combines strong authentication techniques with
conventional password-based techniques providing high ac-
curacy. In our approach, for which we have presented a
possible implementation with one biometric technique (face
recognition) and a password based technique in [2], different
trust levels are set for different methods of authentication.
When a user gains access to a protected facility, our system
continuously checks whether the users’ authentication data
can be trusted, e.g. enough to satisfy the required security
clearance level. If trust is sufficiently high, no action is
taken. When trust gets too low, the system chooses a suitable
authentication technique, gets the corresponding biometric
data, and decides whether the new information satisfies the
required security level. In this way, users are kept under
a continuous authentication process and security clearance
levels can be rigorously maintained.
A. Architecture
Our approach includes a trust evaluation process which
continuously checks the identity of the user who is per-
forming a certain activity on the web. Figure 1 shows the
basic steps of our process: after an initial authentication, the
server can require further authentication steps based on two
parameters 1) the level of trust previously computed and 2)
the time passed from the last authentication. We suppose the
first authentication to have been performed using both strong
and weak techniques. Indeed the userID is used to choose
in the database the template to be used in the matching of
the biometric acquisitions, because in a matching one-to-one
the error rates are significantly reduced. The following steps,
instead, can be acquired by strong or weak techniques on the
basis of the trust level.
B. Trust Evaluation Parameters
In our model each user authentication can be performed
using strong or weak authentication techniques. The BIO
value represents how the biometric enrollment matches the
user’s template, normalized in the range [0, 1]. The second
authentication parameter, TOK, corresponds to the boolean
output (low/high) of the weak authentication system which
supports the evaluation of the trust in the user’s identity dur-
ing the activity. In our prototype we used a UserId/password
system. At the initial authentication step, the weak technique
is involved to enforce the biometric acquisition and the
parameter TOK, if the authentication successes, is set to high,
i.e. equal to 1. Two aging parameters, respectively for the
biometric and the token parameter values, are defined in
order to measure how the system’s trust in the identity of
the user decays in time [2].
1) Trust Evaluation Parameter BIO in case of biomet-
ric multi-modal authentication: In particular environments,
where security is a strategic issue, it can be important to use
a multi-modal technique for the evaluation of the parameter
user computer
server
Authentication
user2 computer2
Identificationdata
Identificat
ion
data Trust rules
Request of authentication renewal/
authentication refused
Request of authentication renewal/
authentication refused
Fig. 1. Context for trust evaluation model.
BIO to be fed into the fuzzy controller. In literature there have
been proposed many general strategies to combine multiple
biometric classifiers. Among them, Ross and Jain [20] have
proved that the SUM works well in improving significantly
authentication performances w.r.t. a mono-modal approach.
Other solutions include majority vote [21], optimal com-
bination of patter classifiers [22], a weighted vote based
on Dempster-Shafer evidence theory [23], binary operators,
etc. Moreover, there are multiple factors that have to be
considered when building a biometric multi-modal system:
• choice and number of biometric features;
• detail level in which feature information have to be
integrated into the classifier;
• adopted methodology used to integrate information;
• cost versus performance evaluation analysis.
The evaluation of these factors strongly depends from the
application and from the set of biometric techniques adopted.
We defer a study in depth of these aspects of the problem
to a future development of a case study with multi-modal
biometric access.
C. Fuzzy Controller Operation
The entire process implemented in our approach is shown
in Figure 2.
At the first step, the information obtained by the biometric
engine, i.e. the value BIO, and the parameter TOK are fed
into a fuzzy inference engine Fuzzy Trust Model in order
to calculate a trust value TRUST that expresses the level of
trust of the system in the user’s identity after the initial
authentication at time t0. Of course, prior to processing
of the inputs, it is necessary to define fuzzy membership
functions which define the degree of membership of each
input parameter in the context of the proposed model. Also,
it is necessary to define the controller’s fuzzy rules. These
aspects strongly depend on the application and have been
detailing discussed in [2] in case study that uses the face
recognition authentication technique.
At time t0 BIO and TOK are initialized; at each time ti
(i > 0), the decay rate of these values will depend on the
corresponding aging parameters. The TRUST value is then
defuzzified through a Defuzzifier engine, using the standard
centroid-of-area technique. The output is then fed to another
fuzzy engine, Fuzzy DSS Model, to compute the final level
of trust. This second engine takes as inputs, together with
the trust defuzzified value, also external conditions, that
may become useful in such a multi-modal authentication
approach, that consider biometric authentication techniques.
Acceptance rate may degrade due to context variables (e.g.,
when the lighting is too bright or too dark). In this setting,
these context variables are generally named CONTEXT and
supposed, for simplicity, with possible fuzzy values “good”
and “poor”. The resulting trust of the Fuzzy DSS Model
is defuzzified again with the standard centroid-of-area tech-
nique, and the output value is compared with the threshold of
the membership functions of the Fuzzy DSS Model at each
time ti.
If the output trust is low the system asks for trust enforce-
ment by going through the Matching phase. In this case the
system asks for a user re-authentication, that can be biometric
or knowledge-based, depending on the BIO and TOK values
at that time ti. In particular, the system re-acquires the
parameter whose value at time ti is less than a corresponding
minimum threshold, previously defined, while maintains the
same value at time ti if it is more than the corresponding
threshold. If the trust output is considered medium or high the
system checks, through the Time Controller module, how the
trust acquired at time ti has been affected by the decay rate
of the BIO and TOK, giving the new, decreased, parameter
values for BIO and TOK at time ti+1. These values are fed
into the Fuzzy Trust Model in order to obtain the new trust
value at time ti+1.
When the trust level decays to the value of very low,
the user inserts two wrong passwords in the same weak
authentication step, or when the maximum value of the
examination time is reached, the execution step goes to the
Close User Working Session and the process stops.
Each of the two fuzzy models has been implemented (see
[2]) with different rules, in order to control the trust value at
each time step ti with respect to different evolved parameters
of BIO and TOK.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper focuses on the problem of a secure strong
authentication of a web navigator. Our approach uses a fuzzy
controller to continuously check the user identity during a
working session. In this paper we deeply discuss biometric
techniques characteristics and their possible use in conjunc-
tion with a fuzzy controller. Moreover we provide a draft of
using our approach with a multi-modal biometric technique
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the Multi-modal Fuzzy Trust Model.
to compute the biometric input of the fuzzy controller. In the
next future we plan to apply our solution to a real case using
multiple devices to compute the biometric input, providing
experimental results and performance analysis.
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